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Getting ethnic questions on the agenda: party formation as a strategy for social 
movements 
 
Introduction 
 
Over the last decades, integration policy in Sweden and the Netherlands has 
undergone a shift towards perceiving the its ethnic communities as permanent 
settlers rather than as temporary measures to remedy labour scarcity. (Pennix 
1989; SIP 1983). Citizenship regulations have been liberalised, allowing non-
citizens to obtain almost all the rights connected with a full citizenship status 
(Soysal 1994). In the Swedish and Dutch case, non-nationals can obtain local 
voting rights without being fully naturalised (3 years of residence in the former 
and 5 years in the latter). State policy has in both countries aimed at the 
inclusion of migrant communities into society in order to promote a notion of 
equality (Sweden) and emancipation (the Netherlands) (Hammar 1985; Pennix, 
1989). The goal of these policies have been to enable the new population to 
participate in the new environment in the same way as the native population 
thereby enjoying the same rights and obligations as the rest of the inhabitants. 
However, despite the rather favourable reputation that the two countries have 
had over the past decades, studies have shown that immigrants tend to be 
underrepresented in political parties and in the different levels of political 
decisionmaking (Ålund and Schierup 1991; Fennema and Tillie 1999; Soininen 
and Bäck 1993). Given this situation, the local political arena in Malmö, Sweden 
was challenged by a new party in the 1998 election. This party, the Rainbow 
Party, strove to make certain claims and bring certain issues onto the political 
agenda that were directly related to the status of being a non-national. These 
included issues such as lack of real political influence and the failure of the 
governing bodies to reflect the growing ethnic diversity of Swedish society. 
However, a similar party could not be found in the Dutch case. This brings us to 
the first question of this article - why was the party formation option adopted in 
one case and not the other? This question is relevant since both Sweden and the 
Netherlands practice a similar way of incorporating the new populations into the 
community structure. The two countries do also display a similar party system 
structure in terms of openness and in the capacity of the political regime. In order 
to explain this phenomena, closer attention will be paid to the concept of political 
opportunity structures and the way that these influence the choice of action 
adopted by new challengers.  Secondly, the paper addresses the question of why 
this particular party formation should be understood as a strategy adopted by a 
social movement rather than as a traditional party. Finally, a modest evaluation 
will be made on the impact and success of this kind of party in the given context, 
could it be considered a useful strategy to be pursued by other groups? 
 
 
The State and political opportunity structures 
 
The concept of power and influence in studies of contemporary society involves 
not only the study of political parties or political actors. The increased presence 
of different social movements has brought a new and interesting addition to this 
field, since these movements strive to put forward their particular claims onto 
the political agenda. These movements have to studied in relation to the state or, 
at least, have the state as a point of reference. The modern democratic state is 
not only the sole legitimate user of violence but is also the provider, and 
guarantor, of socially valued goods. In other words, the state is simultaneously 
target, sponsor and opponent for social movements (Jenkins and Klandermans 
1995). 
The state provides the settings that make up the political environment 
and as such does also determine the rules and boundaries that social movements 
are obliged to follow. In this environment there are certain conditions which can 
either facilitate or constrain the political opportunities that these actors face in 
order to pursue their goals. These opportunities can be expressed in terms of 
relative openness of closure if the institutionalised political system, the stability 
of elite alignments, presence of elite allies and the state’s capacity to repress 
actors (McAdam 1996). But political opportunity structures are not only 
determined by the presence of the state. This concept does further compromise 
specific configurations of resources, institutional arrangements and historical 
precedents for groups to mobilise. The political opportunity structure serves as a 
necessary condition of the movements’ ability to influence and, more 
importantly, what strategies it chooses to take (Kitschelt 1986). These structures 
do not produce social movements or insurgency, but should rather be viewed as 
consistent dimensions of political struggle that encourage people to engage in 
politics (Tarrow 1994). Does this then stipulate that mobilisation and political 
claims making only happens if the surrounding political environment is of a 
certain kind that allows this transition to be possible? Not necessarily, the point 
is that these structures shape the way in which social movements are formed and 
in what way and with what measures they try to act on the political arena. It is 
the political context that is the important cue to how social movements can draw 
on resources from this environment. Previous explanations of why collective 
action emerges tend to neglect the political conditions in which resource-poor 
and exploited groups could have been expected to mobilise on behalf of their 
interests. The Marxist tradition emphasises different elements of collective 
action: cleavages in capitalist society which gave rise to mobilisation potential, 
certain movement organisation factors necessary to structure movements or the 
need for consensus building around party goals  (Tarrow 1994). Focus has been 
on the internal structure of the movement rather than taking into account the 
way in which the movement is shaped and why it chooses a certain strategy.  
The ideas behind political opportunity structures are not of a monolithic 
kind but can be analytically divided into four categories: formal institutional 
structures, national cleavage structures, informal procedures and alliance 
structures.  
The first concerns the legal and institutional arrangements, which sets the 
relationship between the state and the new actors. Dimensions involved here are 
the degrees of centralisation of political institutions, type of electoral system and 
separation of powers. This dimension establishes the channels of access 
available for the potential challenger. The second defines the political space that 
is available for challengers to introduce new conflicts into a polity. The 
opportunities for mobilisation are related to the politicised cleavages in society 
concerning, for instance, national identities or class. 
The third dimension maps out the rules and procedures that have 
emerged within the polity for conflict management and resolution. As opposed to 
the cleavage approach, the informal channels refer to the modes through which 
political conflicts have been dealt with by political elites. Finally, alliance 
structures determine the specific balance of power between different actors at a 
certain time and place. This includes party composition, party systems and the 
relative strength of political parties and the government (Tarrow 1994).  
The political opportunities available are also depending on the relative 
openness of the political system. Here, the focus is on the input-side of the policy 
process, getting demands onto the political agenda. But as Kitschelt (1986) 
points out, the output phase does also affect the mobilisation and opportunities 
for social movements to push a certain issue into implementation. The openness 
of a political regime can be said to be a function of the number of political 
parties, fractions and groups that try articulate demands. The relationship is: 
more actors create a centrifugal political system in which cartels of established 
parties hinder electoral interest articulation.  
Secondly, if the capacity of the legislature to develop and control policies 
is independent from the executive body, openness will increase. Thirdly, if links 
between the interest groups and the executive branch are fluid, access to 
decision-making is facilitated. Fourthly, new demands must find their way into 
the process of policy formation in order to aggregate these demands. Openness is 
constrained if there are no viable procedures to build effective policy coalitions. 
On the output-side, the political structure can be either weak or strong, in the 
sense of getting the demand into action. National policies are implemented more 
effectively if the state is of a centralised character. The degree of state control, 
co-ordination or exclusions of certain actors influence political efficiency and 
limits the resources available for challengers. Finally, policy implementation 
becomes more difficult if the courts are able to influence executive branch 
control. However, social movements can bring about changes in the opportunity 
structure as a result of its own actions - that is, the relationship between the 
movement and the structure simultaneously influence each other (Tilly 1978). 
Social movements can also be creative and choose forms of mobilisation which 
are unexpected by the elite, like for instance registering an organisation as a 
party, as in the Swedish case. This choice can create new opportunities for them 
in the existing structure. The movement can also create opportunities for others 
in that collective action expands the opportunities for other challenging groups. 
This works both positively (an issue is put on the agenda which other groups can 
copy, innovate upon or form alliances with) and negatively (the movement 
creates a counter movement). The elites and authorities can also respond to the 
actions taken by the social movement, either positively (forming alliances) and 
negatively (repressing actions). In the former case, reform of the polity is the 
most likely outcome, especially if the responding actor gains an advantage from 
the coalition with the movement. In the latter, opportunities can be shutdown, if 
the movement is perceived as a threat to the social order (Tarrow 1996). 
  
 
Social Movements 
 
In what way does a social movement differ from other mobilising types such as 
interest groups or parties? The difference between these actors becomes clearer 
if one distinguishes between three sets of characteristics - modes of operation, 
main resources and structural features (Rucht 1996). A social movement 
typically relies on protest activities as their mode of operation rather than 
aiming for member representation in politics (interest groups) or occupation of 
political offices (parties). Also, they draw resources from primarily devoted 
followers rather than access to decision-makers (interest groups) or voters 
(parties) and are organised informally rather the formally. The Rainbow Party 
does display characteristics from all three groups, so why would they be better 
understood if viewed as a social movement, rather than as a party or interest 
group?  
In essence, they were driven by other incentives than those found among 
interest groups or parties. Here, a set of people with a common problem became 
grievance conscious of their shared fate and built an organisation for the pursuit 
of their aims (Tilly 1981). Furthermore, they aimed at influencing public policy 
(political integration of migrants), frame social problems (discrimination on the 
labour market) and lacked the necessary political and material resources in 
order to routinely access political decision-makers (McCarthy et al 1996). The 
similarities with social movements increases further if one invokes the three 
traits suggested by Zirakzadeh (1997). Firstly, a social movement is a group of 
people who consciously try to build a radically new social order. The Rainbow 
Party not only tried to challenge the decisions made by the local authorities but 
did also strive to make a long-term and significant change in the texture of the 
society. Secondly, a social movement consists of people from a wide range of 
social backgrounds who in their daily lives lack substantial political punch and 
whose interests are not articulated or represented in the political system1. Here, 
the claim was that immigrants, as a group, lack any form of real political 
influence and are not properly represented in the local municipality. Thirdly, 
social movements tend to use politically confrontational or socially disruptive 
tactics in order to influence government officials, deter social opponents and/or 
attract supporters or, most likely, to attract media attention, to a greater extent 
than interest groups or political parties. In this case, by accusing politicians of 
racism and discrimination in their parties, the party managed to draw a 
significant amount of media coverage and attention to their cause. 
 
 
The potential to mobilise: political opportunity structures in Sweden 
and the Netherlands  
 
Following Tarrow’s disposition, the following section will use the four 
dimensions of political opportunity structures (POS) and apply them to the 
Swedish and Dutch context. A distinguishing feature of Swedish and Dutch policy 
in the area of integration is that they both operate according to a corporatist 
style of incorporating the new population. This model involves an inclusion of 
individual influence through party-channels as well as group influence via 
organisations. These settings constitute an institutional framework - originating 
from a top-down perspective where government recognises and identifies the 
needs and rights of the immigrants - and provides the context in which 
immigrant interests can be mobilised. In the Swedish case, corporatist influence 
                                                 
1
 These are usually of a non-elite character, lacking any real influence over the decisions taken that will 
directly influence their lives (McAdam 1982) or the access to the decisions-making procedure (Gamson 
1975). 
is primarily practised through interest groups, such as the labour organisation. 
Membership is organised around a belonging to a corporate group, defined by 
occupational, ethnic, religious or gender identity, with a strong emphasis on 
equality. Immigrants are seen as a natural social grouping and are thus treated 
like other corporate groups. In the Netherlands, the main goal has been to 
provide the immigrant groups with opportunities to become emancipated. This 
key term originates from the process of religious liberation which, unlike 
Sweden, has resulted in a division along religious lines, the so-called ‘pillars’. 
Emancipation resulted in that the organisation of social, cultural and political 
functions has been according to these pillars. Each of these pillars were allocated 
their own schools, welfare systems and unions. Immigrant communities were 
subsequently perceived as yet another pillar in the Dutch system (Soininen 
1999; Soysal 1994). 
 A central feature in both Sweden and the Netherlands is the high level of 
centralisation and organisation in the field of immigration. In Sweden, the 
national board of immigration (Statens Invandrarverk, SIV) is the prime 
authority on the state level. The SIV makes decisions about visas, employment 
and residence permits and naturalisation. There’s a close working relationship 
with the national labour market board (Arbetsmarknadsstyrelsen, AMS) which 
deals with training and employment projects directed at immigrants. Although 
highly centralised in one sense, immigrant policy is administered primarily on 
the local municipality level.  The main responsibility lies with the ordinary 
administration; the social welfare offices, local housing authorities, schools, etc. 
(Hammar 1985). The Netherlands does not have an SIV equivalent that deals 
with migrant matters per se. Here, ministerial bodies and intermediary 
institutions take charge of different aspects of incorporation.  Although 
autonomous in relation to the state, they are fully funded by state spending and 
centrally organised. Co-ordination is an important aspect of the administration, 
and is executed by a group of ministerial committees, including the Directorate 
for the Co-ordination of Minorities Policy (DCM) under the ministry of Home 
Affairs and the Interministreal Co-ordinating Committee on Minorities Policy. 
The DCM is the central body between the national government and the migrant 
groups. In Sweden and the Netherlands, state funds support the institutional 
framework for collective organisation. The state allocates certain functions such 
as interest representation and consultative participation creating a unified and 
bureaucratic network. Even spontaneous and oppositional movements are 
incorporated into this scheme by being dependent on state funding (Soysal 
1994). Financing a movement or an association is dependent on the number of 
members enrolled, making member allocation a prime directive for the 
associations.  If an immigrant group or a coalition of groups intend to place 
issues that concern them onto a political agenda, this has to be done through an 
organisation which is closely connected to the state. In Sweden, the traditional 
source of political mobilisation, outside of the mainstream parties, has been 
through the so-called ‘folkrörelser’ (people’s movements). Closer defined, these 
movements are highly institutionalised popular movements with a symbiotic 
relationship with an enlightened and reforming state-bearing elite (Ålund and 
Schierup 1991; Micheletti 1994).  
The most famous example is the Swedish national labour organisation which 
not only worked in a close relationship with the Socialdemocratic party but also 
managed to influence the shape of the welfare-system (Kjellberg 1988; Lundquist 
1992). Immigrant associations are part of this organisational system and thus Sweden 
displays the highest proportion of organised immigrants in Europe. These associations 
are organised in a parallel fashion corresponding to ethnic identity and supervised by 
the SIV. This mode of incorporation aggregates interest groups into federations, which 
are formally or informally involved in the policy-process. The result is either direct 
consultation of interest groups or self-administration by federations at the local, 
regional or national level (Janoski 1998). In the Netherlands the relationship between 
the state and the immigrant organisations are similar. The government supports 
associations financially and is supervised by an intermediary body, the National 
Advisory Council for Ethnic Minorities (LAO). Claims and requests are made through 
the LAO, which then channels these claims via sub-councils. These formal 
institutional structures do to a large extent determine the levels of access to the state 
as well as the capacity for different actors to participate. States in this case can be 
characterised as being either strong or weak in terms of three institutional arenas – the 
parliamentary, administrative and direct-democratic arena. In the parliamentary arena 
the critical indicators are the number of parties, factions and groups as well the 
possibility of forming viable policy coalitions (Laver and Schofield 1991). The 
number of parties is a function of the national conflict structure and the electoral 
system. The relationship is, the more heterogeneous the national conflict structure is 
and the higher degree of proportionality, the larger the number of parties. As a 
challenger, the proportional system facilitates access compared to plurality or majority 
systems. Seen from the established parties’ point of view, this means a greater risk of 
being subjected to competition from challengers than in the plural or majority case. A 
higher number of parties will also facilitate for social movements to find established 
support within the party system.   
The second aspect, the administrative arena, concerns the formal access as 
well as the capacity to act and is determined by the amount of resources at the disposal 
of the administration, by the structure of the interest groups and by the structural 
arrangements established between the two. The relationship is, the greater amount of 
resources available for the administration and the greater the degree of coherence and 
internal co-ordination, the stronger the connection. Both Sweden and the Netherlands 
have multiple levels of state co-ordination and steering of both immigrant associations 
and the intermediate bodies that handle the relation between organisations and the 
state apparatus. Challengers not part of this highly institutionalised and encompassing 
arrangement of policy negotiation will find the system inaccessible and difficult to 
influence. The corporatist trait prevailing hinders certain types of new challengers, 
especially those not based on social class. In for instance the Social Democratic Party, 
decisions have to be anchored in one of the party’s many sub-branches such as the 
labour union or labour communes. Immigrants are not perceived to be representing 
any social class or organisation. (Westin 1998). The final point about the relative 
strength of the state regards the direct-democratic arena. Here, formal access is a 
function of the degree to which direct-democratic procedures are institutionalised, 
most commonly in the form of a referendum. As a challenger to the system, the most 
important direct-democratic procedure is the popular initiative which allows them to 
put an issue on the agenda of the political system and to ask the whole electorate to 
vote on the subject (as practised in Switzerland). The downturn of this option is that it 
only gives oppositional intervention after an elite decision has been taken. In the 
Netherlands, citizens do have rights to appeal (the so-called inspraak) in the course of 
implementation of public policies (Duyvendak and Koopmans 1992). In the Swedish 
case the political culture has been characterised by its consensual democratic 
appearance and its long-term stability. The former involves a liberal democratic state 
with a low level of opposition to the framework of rules and regulations for the 
resolutions of political conflict within the state (Elder et al 1988). The latter indicates 
the status of the political structure. Firstly, the 349 seats in the parliament are 
distributed proportionally to the parties who manage to pass the four-percentage 
barrier (or twelve percent in the territorial constituency). Although a certain amount of 
the governing power is decentralised to the regional and municipal levels, there is still 
a close relationship between the different authorities since the municipal assemblies 
are responsible for implementing national decisions on a local level. However, the 
local authorities do have a strong independence in relation to the central authorities 
when it comes to managing their own affairs, such as health and educational issues. 
Local politics are furthermore strongly focused on local needs, giving the participating 
parties the opportunity to sharpen their profiles as well as facilitating for smaller 
parties to pursue specific questions (Wallin 1991). Setting up a new, local party is 
relatively easy, seeing that no major formal requirements are involved apart from a 
simple registration procedure. This setting enabled the Rainbow Party to quickly 
establish themselves as a party challenger. The party profile was explicitly local in 
that their prime concern was that the existing local parties did not represent the 
immigrant population in Malmö in a satisfactory way and in being an immigrant in 
Malmö the opportunities to influence were narrowed.  
As in Sweden, the Netherlands practices a proportional distribution of 
parliamentary seats. This system converts the nation into one constituency and has 
weakened the basis for strong regional identification (Goudsblom 1967). The party-
system is characterised by a multi-party system, much more so than in Sweden. Parties 
are organised according to the basic social and religious cleavages formed by the 
pillarisation. This division has rendered the creation of a considerable amount of 
parties that are not only of a purely local kind, but do also extend nationally and 
beyond one issue politics. Since the proportional system was introduced in 1933, the 
relative access to entry became easier in terms of establishing new parties attempting 
to access the political arena. Since 1967, approximately twenty parties have been 
active in the elections. However, as in Sweden, five parties have been dominating the 
electoral system in the post-war period. Despite being decentralised to a certain 
extent, the Dutch regions and municipalities have a limited impact on policy-making 
as such and operate similarly as its Swedish counterparts (Andeweg and Galen 1993). 
Constitutionally, two concepts are leading for the local government - autonomy and 
co-government. The former refers to the policy domain in which the municipal 
government has independent authority, whereas the latter states its position in terms of 
national legislation implementation. Both systems can hence be characterised as being 
relatively open. Closer defined, this means that the determining factors of this 
‘openness’ are present in both the Swedish and the Dutch political structures, that is 
the capacity to of the political system to convert demands into public policy. Both 
countries have several political parties and modes of interest groups to channel their 
demands. The intermediary structures between interest groups and the executive 
branch is plural and fluid which facilitates access for new interests to access decision-
making (Kitschelt 1986).  
Tarrow’s second category examines the political space available to social 
movement challengers. The chances to mobilise are here shaped by prevailing 
politicised cleavages in society, for instance class conflicts or controversy of 
national identities. If an issue divides the elite and creates internal conflict, the 
new social movement can exploit this or make allegiances with opposing parties. 
In Sweden this has evolved around class-based issues, juxtaposing the two 
dominant parties, Social Democrats and Conservatives, over time. The labour 
organisation in Sweden, with its’ strong ties to the Social Democratic Party, got 
involved with the Agrarian Party when the latter pressured for extended 
citizenship and workers rights in the 1930s and 40s (Lewin 1988). Similarly, the 
Socialdemocrats have tried to establish links with the different immigrant 
organisations in order to gain their electoral support since a majority of the 
Swedish immigrants have been part of the ‘working class’ (Widgren 1982). 
However, an explicit attempt was made by the Conservative Party in 1999 to 
challenge the left’s dominance over the immigrants’ votes (Friborg 1999). A 
report put forward at the annual Conservative congress in June 1999 suggested 
that the party needed to profile themselves more explicitly towards the different 
migrant communities (Rojas 1999).  The opportunity available here is to affiliate 
with the party that might provide the best outcome. The Rainbow Party tried to 
take advantage of the competitive element. However, when trying to establish 
working relationships with other parties, the responses received were moderate 
and in some cases even hostile. Especially the Socialdemocrats became very 
concerned with this new challenger. The following quote highlights this 
situation.  
 
 “As we joined in the campaign in 1998, the Social Demorats became very 
interested and preoccupied with the Rosengård area (a immigrant dominated 
area in Malmö, my note) /.../ on election day they asked, “Are you going to vote?” 
and a lot of people understood that as “Are you going to vote for us?” (Laukkanen 
2000) 
 
The Rainbow Party was also much of a response to the lack of action taken by the 
several immigrant associations. These organisations had not used this channel to 
introduce their demands as much as one might had expected. Predominantly, 
these organisations have not functioned as spokespersons for the immigrants’ 
social, political or cultural interests but have rather been preoccupied with 
sporting and traditional cultural preservation activities. Since voting rights for 
denizens and certain linguistic rights have already been implemented, specific 
immigrant interests have been subordinated (Soininen 1999).  The opportunity 
available for the individual migrant is then to affiliate with a certain party or an 
interest group. The difficulty with this approach is that the corporatist model of 
representation is primarily based around class interest that hinders, for instance, 
the labour union to recognise interests stemming from other causes. Immigrant 
questions were given low priority and politicians with an immigrant background 
faced difficulties obtaining party support for nominations in elections (Ålund and 
Schierup 1991), an experience which was also true for the Rainbow Party 
candidates. 
 
 “We had the experience that it was not easy to get involved in the 
established parties and we did often discuss the alternative to go to other 
parties...and we did see some immigrants who had succeeded, but they were 
forced to transform themselves, so suddenly they were no longer part of “us” but 
of  “them” instead” (Laukkanen 2000). 
 The Dutch case differs slightly in this sense in that it gives rise to a rather 
paradoxical situation in terms of the political system. As Lijphart (1968) 
observes, the Netherlands should be overshadowed by conflicts and antagonism 
rather then consensus and co-operation. Seeing that Dutch society is 
characterised by a plethora of social cleavages where religious and class 
divisions separate distinct and self-contained parts of the population, one would 
tend to expect ideological tension and extremism instead of pragmatism and 
moderation. The pillarisation that occurred due to the religious segmentation 
created a form of civic organisation, which was interconnected through personal 
links at the elite level, what Lijphart calls the ‘consociational democracy’. This 
condition determines the mobilisation potential (Klandermans and Oegema 
1987) to which people could be mobilised by a social movement. The 
mobilisation potential varies according to the degree to which the cleavages 
constitute social groups that are clearly segmented from each other and 
internally highly integrated. Bartolini and Mair (1990) refer to this as the relative 
degree of closure where the cleavage is a structure of processes that restrict 
mobility in a variety of ways including marriage, educational system, social 
customs, religious practices, etc. The notion of closure is important since a highly 
integrated group in a fragmented surrounding constitutes a suitable foundation 
for political mobilisation. That is, it is the groups’ distinctiveness, in terms of 
collective identity, common interests or a shared consciousness of belonging to a 
unique group that is crucial for their mobilisation potential (Oberschall 1973).  
A second aspect is the salience of the cleavage, that is to what degree it 
dominates the conflicts on the political arena in terms of its relative importance 
with respect to other cleavages. The more institutionalised the political cleavage 
is the more regulated it becomes by established procedures and the groups 
involved become more integrated into the political networks of the 
administrative and parliamentary arena. The Dutch pillar system consisting of 
class and religious cleavages constitute highly integrated groups with rather 
peaceful relationships with each other marking an instrumental stabilisation of 
the relationship on an elite level where the elites are able to exercise control 
over the grassroots movement. Since immigrant communities are seen as yet 
another form of ‘pillar’ in the Dutch society the are also subdued to work within a 
system that promotes the maintenance of an existing system (Bagley 1973). As in 
Sweden, organisational activities are primarily concerned with non-political 
activities such as community development, cultural activities or emancipation 
activities. Seeing that the Netherlands displays a similar amount of immigrant 
organisations as in Sweden, a unified organisation of, for instance, specific 
Turkish interests requires the collaboration of internally diverse groups. A task 
which has proven to be difficult in practice (Soysal 1994). Seeing that the major 
source of political discrepancy would most probably be found in terms of 
religious affiliation, creating alignments with different parties would have to be 
based on this notion rather than class belonging, as in Sweden. The two major 
religious groups are Protestants Catholics but among the four dominating 
immigrant groups, two of them (Turks and Moroccans) are mainly of Islamic 
belief, which could make religious collaboration slightly problematic. Therefore, 
it seems that alignment with a certain party in the Dutch case is less probable 
than in Sweden.  
Tarrow’s third dimension deals with the more indirect and informal 
channels that have been shaped within a polity in order to deal with conflicts and 
resolutions. How has the political elite dealt with the demands of new 
challengers? For instance, one could view the extensive nature of the rights and 
benefits available to the new population working in the opposite way and 
actually pacifying these groups since there is not much more to struggle for. As 
the president of the Association of Women from Turkey in Sweden expressed it, 
“we cannot mobilise the Turkish population around any real demands...Most 
rights and freedoms are already given by the state, and there is already an 
organisation for every problem that migrants face in this country” (Soysal 
1994:99). In the Netherlands, attempts were made to establish separate 
immigrant parties, but their life-span was relatively short and their impact 
minor, especially after local voting rights were introduced in 1985 (van der 
Wusten and Roessingh 1997). However, immigrant parties could theoretically 
stand a chance of obtaining parliamentary seats. Seeing that the Netherlands 
practice a proportional representational system by the means of a party list 
(described further in Steiner 1998), small fringe parties have a chance of winning 
parliamentary representation. This environment differs from the Swedish case in 
which parties must pass a 4-percent threshold. Also, emerging parties are not 
eligible for governmental party funding aid unless they manage to obtain seats in 
the municipality. This threshold singles out a majority of prospering parties, in 
that they might not have the economic resources to continue. Conflict resolution 
in corporatist states is very much dependent on negotiations between the state 
and the different corporate groupings. Traditionally, this has been done between 
the labour movement and the state. The former must have a high degree of 
membership in order to not be ignored by the negotiating partner. The same 
goes for immigrant organisations. However, membership rates have not been 
sufficiently high (at least not compared with other actors) and are also scattered 
around Swedish and Dutch society. Therefore, immigrants wishing to put their 
interests on the political agenda have been redirected towards the major actors 
rather than through their own organisations. Furthermore, immigrant 
associations are relying on a healthy relationship with the authorities in order to 
receive funding for their activities, which in practice could mean that their 
organisational freedom is constrained. This precarious relationship is described 
by a Rainbow Party member as a major obstacle for migrant political 
participation. 
 
 
 
 “...through these structures and mechanisms those organisations are 
tamed and practically all they think about is to get funds for their activities, so 
they are really tamed and don’t dare to think about those questions that we have, 
They know they will be punished, just like the IPF got punished, because all aid 
and funds will disappear” (Laczak 2000). 
 
In the case of the Rainbow Party, they emerged from an association called the 
IPF2.   As an association, the IPF was interested in issues such as the declining 
political interest among the immigrant communities and how to get more people 
with a non-Swedish heritage involved in local politics. These interests and 
pursuits were rather unique when compared to the activities performed by other 
immigrant associations, who mainly deal with general cultural events or sporting 
activities (Ålund and Schierup 1991). The interviewees argued that that being an 
immigrant organisation trying to make demands and political claims was not 
perceived as appropriate associational behaviour by the Swedish society. 
Continuing as the old association proved to be very difficult. By forming a party, 
they would be perceived as being more serious and also become more 
independent in relation with the Swedish state. Furthermore, immigrant 
interests seem to get lost when they enter, for instance, the labour union, since 
this movement is primarily concerned with issues of class rather than ethnicity. 
Although membership rates in unions are similar to that of the native Swedes, 
immigrants are less likely to be a union representative and are also notoriously 
underrepresented in both interest groups and political parties (Bäck and 
Soininen 1996). The Netherlands does also display a large amount of organised 
immigrants whose prime directives are to support religious and cultural 
activities, and to a lesser extent, to promote immigrant interests and political 
ends. However, the Dutch case provides representation for migrants to a larger 
extent then in Sweden through the LAO. This central administrative body serves 
as an intermediator and provides the migrant associations with a channel for 
participation on the national level through sub-councils that represents 
nationality and minority groups. This has enabled, primarily, the Turkish 
community to become very active and influential in establishing an Islamic 
identity in the Dutch society.   
However, migrant associations are only eligible for state subsidising if they 
operate on a national level and perform certain functions decided by the state. 
These include promoting migrants’ interests, providing informational, cultural 
and emancipation activities for their national constituencies (Soysal 1994). 
Although being categorised as relatively open, the corporatist states often limit 
the number of relevant interest groups, in which there is in essence one single 
group for each interest sector. To gain entry to the political arena is constrained 
by the state through requirements and the goal of the organisation to be 
‘representative’ of its members, which in turn forces the association to 
                                                                                                                                            
2
 Invandrarpolitiska Föreningen: trans. the Political Association for Immigrants. 
accumulate a large number of members (Wilson 1990). Corporatism can thus be 
viewed as way to domesticate uncontrolled (and unrecognised) political claims 
making by channelling action into acceptable forms.  
Finally, with regards the opportunities for challengers to mobilise when 
the political elites are internally divided and/or forming strategic balance of 
power relationships, the Swedish and Dutch case displays a rather stable 
scenario. In Sweden, the Social Democratic party has enjoyed a long-term stay as 
the party in government, more or less uninterrupted since the 1930s. 
Traditionally, the Socialdemocrats had relied on the support from the Left Party 
in order to secure their minority government position (Ersson 1991). The 
ideological division has created a block system in which a Left - Right division 
prevails. The strategy available here is what Smith (1991) calls the ‘third party 
problem’ in which a small party positions itself between the two dominating 
blocks and becomes a potential coalition partner. This was the case in the 1988 
election in which the Green Party managed to influence the agenda by forming an 
alliance with the Social Democratic block. In Malmö local politics, this traditional 
left-right division and alliance was disrupted when the Scania Party 
(Skånepartiet) appeared in the 1985 election and managed to gain five seats in 
the local municipality3. The presence of anti-immigrant sentiments producec a 
counter movement in the form of an explicit immigrant party. However, 
alignment formation proved to be difficult despite a vast amount of media 
coverage and access to the political platforms through debates and press 
conferences. The party formation strategy proved to be far more problematic 
than initially perceived, not only in terms of resistance faced by a majority of the 
established political actors, but also in terms of financing the movement. Seeing 
that governmental party support is only available after a party gains 
representation, the Rainbow Party had to rely on voluntary work and donations 
from sponsors. This obstacle relates to what McCarthy and Zald (1977) labels 
“resource-mobilisation”. This term not only refers to the need of one or more 
                                                 
3
 The Scania Party can be, briefly, described as a populist party with xenophobic ideas (see 
Peterson et al 1998 for a more thorough discussion on the party and its ideas). The appearance of 
the Scania Party was followed-up by a local referendum in the municipality of Sjöbo (a neighbour 
to Malmö), in which the voters were asked whether they wanted the municipality to arrange 
settlement for a group of refugees. They outcome was negative, despite positive encouragement 
from the national parties, and no refugees were placed in Sjöbo (Hammar 1991). 
persons within a social movement to bring in monetary resources from a third 
party, but also to the ability to access political, legal and media support. As 
mentioned above, when trying to establish working relationships with the 
dominating parties, the response received was moderate, and in some cases even 
hostile, except from the Green Party (Miljöpartiet). 
 
 “...they tried to establish a dialogue with us from the start. They said that 
their manifesto was compatible with ours. The Green Party took it more 
seriously, they wanted to co-operate with us and they wanted us to join their 
organisation. We got invited to a debate, which we re-named a dialogue, there 
wasn’t much to debate against, more of a discussion about questions that were 
similar for the both of us...they paid for newspaper advertisement. That was very 
positive for us, it made us look more legitimate, that they took us seriously” 
(Laukkanen 2000).  
 
The positive response from the Green Party is not very surprising given that the 
Rainbow Party’s manifesto is, if not identical, at least very similar to that of the 
Greens, something that the interviewees openly admit to. By affiliating the 
Rainbow Party with the Greens, the party gained access to a wider scope of 
opportunities to influence the local agenda. The candidates could use the means 
available offered by an established party, but this did also mean that their 
previous profile had to be re-negotiated. In the 1998 election the Rainbow Party 
only managed to receive 0.7 percent of the votes in Malmö and thus were not 
entitled to any municipality seats or monetary support. This outcome and the 
previous engagement with the Greens generated an outflow of Rainbow Party 
candidates to the Green party. In retrospect, the Rainbow Party does not only 
share similarities with a social movement utilising the opportunities provided by 
the Swedish system and organising a suitable strategy according to these, they 
also share similarities with what Johnson (1981) has identified as a tribune 
party. Drawing on the experiences from the French PCF party, Johnson suggest 
that a tribune party works according to a principle in which gaining political 
representation is not the prime directive. Although, this line of thought seems 
rather contradictive in that it lies in the very core of a party to be interested in 
gaining at least a minimum of parliamentary influence, the idea of a tribune party 
can highlight the particularity of the Rainbow Party.  The function of the party 
was to organise and defend a social group who were excluded and/or felt 
themselves to be excluded from the process of participation in the political 
system and the benefits of the economic and cultural system. The existence of a 
tribune party relies on three preconditions. Firstly, there must prevail a large 
and relatively homogenous group that it represents. A group which, despite its 
size, is poorly integrated into the political and cultural system and thus placed in 
a position of inferiority. Secondly, the political structure in which such a party 
operates must tolerate a tribune party’s actions by legitimating the right of 
political defence. That is, the recognition of the party’s right to oppose the 
perceived imperfections of the system. Thirdly, the group or groups must be 
willing to settle for political defence primarily rather than passiveness or open 
revolt (see also Lavou 1969).  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The aim of this paper has been to examine the opportunities that exist for non-
established actors to influence and challenge the Swedish and Dutch political 
system. More specifically, the actors addressed have been the immigrant 
population and the possibilities available for them in a corporatist environment. 
The new population in Sweden and the Netherlands are encouraged by official 
policy to become integrated in the receiving society. Citizenship regulations are 
liberal, public funding is available for organisational activities and the state 
supports and recognises difference in ethnic or cultural backgrounds. Both 
countries are relatively open in terms of the capacity to convert demands into 
public policy. However, this seems to be limited to the larger parties or interest 
groups such as the labour movements. Minor scale social movements lack the 
necessary means in order to pursue their goals and are directed to the major 
actors. Taking advantages of political cleavages is a second form of opportunity 
structure in which a movement or group can establish an alliance with a party, 
disrupting the equilibrium. In Sweden this has been done in accordance to class-
membership through large corporatist groups. The channels available for 
immigrants here is by using their organisational or associational platform, which 
have been predominately used for other, non-politicised, purposes. Seeing that 
class issues dominate the public discourse, an explicit ethnic agenda has been 
difficult to pursue. The Dutch case is slightly different, mainly relying on religious 
affiliation rather than class, but this strategy has been under-utilised since the 
dominating religious beliefs differs from the main religious practice of the Dutch 
immigrants. The formal and informal ways of conflict resolution is a third 
possibility. Once again, non-party affiliators have to rely on a strong 
organisational backup, which means a large organisation that will not be ignored 
by the negotiating partner. Immigrant interests are not actively promoted by 
their representing associations, steering them towards other organisations in 
which their particular interest might get lost. However, this channel seems to be 
used more often in the Netherlands than in Sweden. The immigrant 
organisations in Sweden are sponsored by the state but are strictly regulated and 
have to perform certain tasks in order to receive monetary funding. Finally, 
challenging groups can find an opportunity to mobilise when the political elites 
are internally divided over a specific issue. This does however presuppose that 
the political system is unstable. The internal division has to be such that 
challenging actors have a realistic chance of gaining influence by affiliation with a 
certain party. Both Sweden and in some sense also the Netherlands have enjoyed 
rather stable scenarios over time, rendering this last dimension also largely 
under-utilised.  
To conclude, despite that both countries pursue an explicit multicultural 
agenda, pursuing immigrant specific issues seems to be rather difficult. The 
challenger can experience numerous thresholds in order to become an influential 
actor on the political arena. As highlighted by the example of the Rainbow Party, 
choosing the party strategy as an alternative to group orientated pressure led the 
candidates to eventually join the party that responded most positively to their 
demands since the opportunities available for new parties were limited.  
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